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Part I: Introduction 
 Michael Brown.  Tamir Rice.  Walter Scott.  These three names gained notoriety across 
the United States in the past three years as unarmed African American males that died as a result 
of fatal police shootings.1   In 2014, Michael Brown was shot and killed by police officer Darren 
Wilson, after Wilson received a call that Brown robbed a convenience store.  Officer Wilson 
reported to the scene and, while there are differing reports of what happened that day, ultimately 
fired twelve rounds from his firearm, striking Brown and killing him.2  Three months later 
twelve-year-old Tamir Rice was shot and killed by officer Timothy Loehmann after Rice pulled 
out a pellet gun out from his waistband.  Officer Loehmann fired his own gun thinking the pellet 
gun was real.  It was not discovered until after the shooting that the weapon was a toy gun.3  In 
April 2015, Walter Scott was shot and killed by officer Michael Slager who fired eight rounds 
into Walter’s back as Walter ran away from the scene.4  
 Although the three scenarios recounted above might seem to suggest that the purpose of 
this article is to address police brutality or racial injustice it is not.  Instead, the purpose of this 
article is to address the question of whether police officers would feel less inclined to discharge 
their weapons if they were operating a weaponized drone from above.  While the thought of a 
police officer operating a weaponized drone might seem like a scene pulled from an action 
                                                 
1 Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, NEW YORK TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html; 
Ashley Fantz, Steve Almasy, & Catherine E. Shoiceht, Tamir Rice Shooting: No Charges for Officers, CABLE NEWS 
NETWORK (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/28/us/tamir-rice-shooting/; Catherine E. Shoichet & 
Chandler Friedman, Walter Scott Case: Michael Slager Released from Jail After Posting Bond, CABLE NEWS 
NETWORK (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/04/us/south-carolina-michael-slager-bail/. 
2 Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, NEW YORK TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html. 
3 Ashley Fantz, Steve Almasy, & Catherine E. Shoiceht, Tamir Rice Shooting: No Charges for Officers, CABLE 
NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/28/us/tamir-rice-shooting/. 
4 Catherine E. Shoichet & Chandler Friedman, Walter Scott Case: Michael Slager Released from Jail After Posting 
Bond, CABLE NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/04/us/south-carolina-michael-slager-
bail/. 
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packed thriller movie, this situation is more realistic than most people think.  In August 2015, 
North Dakota became the first state to allow police to equip drones with non-lethal weapons, 
including tasers and rubber bullets.5  While this law currently only affects a small portion of 
Americans, this legislation sets a precedent for other states to follow.  Tennessee and South 
Carolina both introduced drone laws in their state legislatures at the end of last year that leave 
police the option to weaponize their drones.6 
  There are two theories behind the idea of weaponizing drones, but these theories 
developed as part of deploying drones overseas and as principles of international law.7  The first 
theory, one that opposes the deployment of weaponized drones, is a humanitarian view that holds 
deploying armed drones is wrong on all accounts because it dehumanizes war.8  It creates what is 
known as a “PlayStation mentality/phenomenon” and increases the likelihood that soldiers would 
be more willing to shoot people from a distance than up close.9  “Operators, rather than seeing 
human beings, perceive mere blips on a screen.”10  Proponents of this view believe that drones 
should not be weaponized or, at the least, calls for an end on using drones for indiscriminate 
killings.11  
The second philosophy is a protectionist view and supports the use of weaponized drones.  
The theory is that when a country is at war the less boots deployed on the ground is better 
                                                 
5 H.R. 1328, 64th Leg. (N.D. 2015). 
6 Joe Wolverton, II, Tennessee, South Carolina Could “Green Light” Weaponized Police Drones, THE NEW 
AMERICAN (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/22238-tennessee-south-
carolina-could-green-light-weaponized-police-drones. 
7 Frederic Megret, Symposium, The Legal and Ethical Limits of Technological Warfare: The Humanitarian Problem 
with Drones, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1283 (2013). 
8 Id. 
9 Chris Cole, Mary Dobbing, & Amy Hailwood, Convenient Killing: Armed Drones and the ‘PlayStation’ Mentality,  
(September 2010), 
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/54c00acde4b022a64cd0266b/t/5584a5d0e4b040d94305c96e/1434756560707/d
rones-conv-killing.pdf.  
10 Id. 
11 Hitomi Takemura, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Humanization from International Humanitarian Law, 32 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 521 (Fall 2014). 
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because it also means fewer casualties.12  “The idea that drones offer a low cost, low risk 
solution to conflict is a seductive one in military circles.”13  Military personnel are captivated by 
the fact that they can win a war without ever having to incur a single casualty. 
The purpose of this article is to examine whether, under international theories of firing 
armed drones, deploying non-lethally weaponized drones above United States soil would make 
police officers more or less likely to shoot their weapon.  It seeks to find whether it would create 
more hostilities between the American people and police or if it could decrease the building 
tension between the two parties.  Part II of this article looks at the constitutionality of deploying 
armed drones above American soil.  Part III delves into the history of drones, and their use in the 
military, and Part IV discusses current drone laws at the federal and state level.  Part V discusses 
international policies about armed drones and applies those theories to domestic law.  Part VI 
debates whether deploying non-lethally armed drones by law enforcement above the United 
States would help deescalate rising police tensions with the public or exacerbate it further. 
Part II: Use of Force Under the Constitution  
 
In Mathews v. Eldridge the court established framework for evaluating due process 
claims under the Fifth Amendment.  Under the Social Security Act, George Eldridge started 
receiving disability benefits in June of 1968, but in March 1972, a state agency reassessed his 
condition and found that his disability should cease.14  Eldridge commenced an action arguing 
that the administrative processes used by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare were 
constitutionally invalid.  Eldridge believed he should continue to receive benefits while his 
                                                 
12 Frederic Megret, Symposium, The Legal and Ethical Limits of Technological Warfare: The Humanitarian 
Problem with Drones, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1283 (2013). 
13 Chris Cole, Mary Dobbing, & Amy Hailwood, Convenient Killing: Armed Drones and the ‘PlayStation’ Mentality 
(September 2010), 
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/54c00acde4b022a64cd0266b/t/5584a5d0e4b040d94305c96e/1434756560707/d
rones-conv-killing.pdf 
14 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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appeal was pending.15  In deciding whether the procedures in place were constitutionally 
adequate, the court looked at three different factors.  “First, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and […]; finally the Government’s interest, including the function 
[…] and fiscal and administrative burdens that […] procedural requirement would entail.”16  
After examining these three factors, the court ruled in favor of the Secretary and held that 
administrative procedures fully corresponded with due process.17  
The comparative case to assess the due process clause under the Fourteenth Amendment 
for a state claim is Johnson v. Glick.  In Johnson v. Glick, Australia Johnson filed a complaint 
against the Warden of the Manhattan House of Detention for Men and Correction Officer John 
Fuller.18  Fuller had reprimanded Johnson for not following his instructions, but when Johnson 
explained that he was following the direction of another officer, Fuller hit Johnson twice over the 
head.19  After striking him in the head, Fuller left Johnson in a holding cell for two hours before 
returning him to his cell.20  Later when Johnson requested medical attention, Fuller escorted 
Johnson from his cell and left him in a holding cell for another two hours before allowing him to 
see the doctor.21  The court discussed the Eight Amendment, freedom from cruel and unusual 
punishment, we well as the Fourteenth Amendment, but decided that only the Fourteenth 
Amendment applied.22  “We assume that brutal police conduct violates the right guaranteed by 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”23 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 349.  
18 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2nd Cir. 1973).  
19 Id. at 1029.  
20 Id.  
21 Id at 1030. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 1031.  
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However in 1989, the case Graham v. Connor overruled the decision of the Johnson 
court.24  In Graham, a police officer stopped a car leaving a convenience store, after one of the 
passengers, in the car, Graham, was seen hastily leaving the store.25  However, Graham was not 
robbing the store, but was a diabetic who felt the onset of an insulin reaction, and was waiting on 
line at the convenience store to buy orange juice.26  When he realized the wait was too long, he 
exited the store and asked the driver of the car to drive him to a friend’s house instead.27  The 
police, however, would not listen to Graham’s diabetic predicament and instead proceeded to 
arrest him using extreme force.28  “At some point during his encounter with the police, Graham 
sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrist, a bruised forehead, and an injured shoulder; he also 
claims to have developed a loud ringing in his right ear that continues to this day.”29 
When the case was originally decided by the District Court, the Court held that the force 
used by the police violated Graham’s Fourteenth Amendment right secured to him under due 
process of the law.30  In analyzing due process, the court looked at the following factors,  
(1) The need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between that need and 
the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted; and (4) 
“whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore 
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”31 
 
The Supreme Court decided against using the due process test to assess the violation of 
Graham’s rights, and instead looked to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
“unreasonable search and seizure.”32  “[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used 
                                                 
24 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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excessive force – deadly or not – in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ 
of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its objective 
‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach.”33  The Fourth 
Amendment analysis requires balancing the individual’s interest with the government’s stake.34   
Therefore, the Court determined that the district court erred in its decision, and the case was 
remanded to the lower court.  
Part III: Drone Background 
 An unmanned aerial vehicle (“UAV”) or drone “is the popular description for anything 
that flies without a pilot at the controls, whether it is controlled directly by an operator on the 
ground or is capable of autonomous flight with no direct human intervention.”35  Drones have 
received a firestorm of criticism and commentary in the past fifteen years during the “War on 
Terror” in Iraq and Afghanistan.  However, this feat in modern technology is not as new as many 
people think.36  “In World War II, radio-controlled B-24s were sent on bombing missions over 
Germany. Remotely controlled aircraft carried still cameras over battlefields in Vietnam. The 
Israeli Army used drones for surveillance and as decoys over Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley in 
1982.”37  In 1973, aerospace engineer Abe Karem created a new type of drone, known as Amber, 
which eventually adapted into the Gnat 750 under General Atomics.38 This unprecedented piece 
of equipment could fly for twelve hours a time, and gave military commanders access to see as 
                                                 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Mark Corcoran, Drone Wars: The Definition Dogfight, AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING COMMISSION (Feb. 28, 
2013), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-03-01/drone-wars-the-definition-dogfight/4546598. 
36 Ajoke Oyegunle, Drones in the Homeland: A Potential Privacy Obstruction Under the Fourth Amendment and 
the Common Law Trespass Doctrine, 21 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 365, 370 (2013). 
37 Mark Bowden, How the Predator Drone Changed the Character of War, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (November 
2013) http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-the-predator-drone-changed-the-character-of-war-
3794671/?no-ist. 
38 The Dronefather, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 1, 20102), http://www.economist.com/news/technology-
quarterly/21567205-abe-karem-created-robotic-plane-transformed-way-modern-warfare. 
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far as sixty miles.39  “By July 1994 General Atomics had incorporated satellite links into the 
Gnat itself, giving the drone a gently rounded nose that belied its pugnacious new name: 
Predator. America now had a platform that could loiter over a target area for days, provide infra-
red and optical surveillance in all weathers.”40 
 On February 4, 2002, the United States used a UAV in Afghanistan for the first targeted 
killing executed by a drone in American history.  The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
believed that the target was Osama bin Laden, but it was wrong.41  “After the February 2002 
strike, military officials quickly acknowledged that the ‘tall man’ was not bin Laden. But they 
insisted the targets were ‘legitimate,’ although they struggled to explain why, using vague and 
even coy language to cover up what appeared to be uncertainty.”42  Since the drone strike in 
February of 2002, an increasingly large number of drone strikes have been carried out in the War 
on Terror.  The Bureau of Investigative Journalism has estimated that just in Pakistan between 
2004 and January 31, 2015, between 2,400 and 3,000 people have been killed, while over a 
thousand more have been injured.43  In May of 2013, President Barak Obama acknowledged 
drone related deaths, especially of innocent civilians in the Middle East.  He stated, “It is a hard 
fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in civilian casualties,” adding, “These deaths will haunt us.”44 
Drones Used to Kill United States Citizens Abroad 
 
                                                 
39 Mark Bowden, How the Predator Drone Changed the Character of War, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (November 
2013) http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-the-predator-drone-changed-the-character-of-war-
3794671/?no-ist. 
40 The Dronefather, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 1, 20102), http://www.economist.com/news/technology-
quarterly/21567205-abe-karem-created-robotic-plane-transformed-way-modern-warfare. 
41 John Sifton, A Brief History of Drones, THE NATION (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/brief-
history-drones/. 
42 Id. 
43 Jack Serle, Almost 2,500 Now Killed by Covert US Drone Strikes Since Obama Inauguration Six Years Ago: The 
Bureau’s Report for January 2015, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Feb. 2, 2015), 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2015/02/02/almost-2500-killed-covert-us-drone-strikes-obama-
inauguration/. 
44 Fawaz Gerges, Why Drone Strikes Are Real Enemy in ‘War on Terror’, CABLE NEWS NETWORK (June 21, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/21/opinion/terrorism-gerges/. 
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 One of the most newsworthy stories about drones broke in May 2014 when the Justice 
Department made public a secret memo from 2011 that justified the killing of American terrorist 
suspects overseas.   In September 2011, drones killed four United States citizens in Yemen, 
including cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who was targeted by the CIA as the “head of foreign 
operations for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.”45  In the years leading up to his death, al-
Awlaki attempted multiple terrorist plots that were foiled.  In 2009, al-Awlaki directed Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab to detonate a bomb hidden in his underwear on a Delta Airlines flight 
bound for Detroit on Christmas.  Additionally, the instructions provided that Abdulmutallab 
detonate the bomb only after the plane was flying over U.S. soil.46  Al-Awlaki was also involved 
in a 2010 terror plot to blow up a U.S. cargo plane by planting bombs into printers.47  In addition 
to the death of al-Awlaki, three other American citizens were killed by drone strikes abroad. 
“Samir Kahn, Abdul Rahman Anwar al-Awlaki and Jude Kenan Mohammed were not targeted 
by the United States” but were killed nonetheless.48  Abdul Rahman Anwar al-Awlaki, the 16-
year-old son of Al-Awlaki, was killed about two weeks after his father in Pakistan.49 
The information about the drone strike became public after a Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) request was filed for the memo in the midst of the nomination of David J. Barron for a 
federal appeals court judgeship.  Originally the federal court rejected the FOIA request, but the 
Second Circuit reversed and ordered the release of the memo.50  Barron was a Harvard law 
                                                 
45 Karen DeYoung & Sari Horowitz, U.S. to Reveal Justification for Drone Strikes Against American Citizens, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (May 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-to-reveal-
justification-for-drone-strikes-against-american-citizens/2014/05/20/f607bb60-e066-11e3-8dcc-
d6b7fede081a_story.html. 
46 Carol Cratty & Joe Johns, Holder: Drone Strikes Have Killed Four Americans Since 2009, CABLE NEWS 
NETWORK (May 23, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/22/politics/drone-strikes-americans/ 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Andrew Westney, 2nd Circ. Releases Redacted Memo on Drone Attacks, LAW 360 (June 23, 2014), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/550696/2nd-circ-releases-redacted-memo-on-drone-attacks. 
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professor and authored the secret memo that legally justified the killings of American citizens 
abroad.51  Barron was eventually confirmed by the Senate, and currently serves on the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit.52  
 The Department of Justice White Paper entitled, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation 
Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An 
Associate Force” sets out the legal reasoning for the constitutionality of killing an American 
citizen abroad involved in terrorist operations.53  
Here the Department of Justice concludes only that where the following three 
conditions are met, a U.S. operation using lethal force in a foreign country against 
a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa’ida or an associate force 
would be lawful: (1) an informed, high level official of the U.S. government has 
determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack 
against the United States, (2) capture is infeasible, and the United States continues 
to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and (3) the operation would be 
conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles.54 
 
The White Paper determined two sets of legal reasoning for the constitutionality of 
killing a U.S. citizen abroad.55  The first legal basis is established under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment, and the due process balancing test under Mathews v. Eldridge.56   As 
mentioned above, under Mathews, the test for due process looks at three factors.57  The test first 
looks at “the private interest that will be affected by the official action.”58  Second it examines 
                                                 
51 Karen DeYoung & Sari Horowitz, U.S. to Reveal Justification for Drone Strikes Against American Citizens, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (May 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-to-reveal-
justification-for-drone-strikes-against-american-citizens/2014/05/20/f607bb60-e066-11e3-8dcc-
d6b7fede081a_story.html. 
52 Adam Serwer, Senate Confirms David Barron to be Federal Judge, MSNBC (May 22, 2014), 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/david-barron-confirmed. 
53 Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-
Qa’ida or An Associate Force, Department of Justice White Paper (2011), 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
58 Id. at 335.  
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“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.”59  Lastly, the test 
examines “the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”60 
Under the Mathews test, Barron justified the killing of al-Awlaki.  Although there is no 
private interest more substantial than one’s own life, when it is balanced against the protection 
and lives of millions of Americans, the interest in killing one American citizen, who is also a 
terrorist is very compelling.61  “The realities of combat render certain uses of force ‘necessary 
and appropriate,’ including force against U.S. citizens who have joined enemy forces in the 
armed conflict against the United States and whose activities pose an imminent threat of violent 
attack against the United States – and ‘due process’ analysis need not blink at those realities.”62  
The government has a substantial interest in protecting their citizens and preventing an imminent 
attack. 63 
 The second legal basis implemented by the White Paper is the Fourth Amendment’s 
unreasonable search and seizure.  “The Supreme Court has made clear that the constitutionality 
of a seizure is determined by ‘balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 
                                                 
59 Id. 
60 Id.  
61 Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-
Qa’ida or An Associate Force, Department of Justice White Paper, pg. 6 (2011), 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. 
62 Id; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004). 
63 Id. 
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individual’s Fourth Amendment interest against the importance of the governmental interest 
alleged to justify the intrusion.’”64  In other words a “reasonableness test” is used.65 
 In this circumstance, the reasonableness test weighs heavily in favor of killing a U.S. 
citizen, who is an al-Qaeda leader abroad in order to protect millions of U.S citizens living on 
American soil.66   
[I]n circumstances where the targeted person is an operational leader of an enemy 
force and an informed, high-level government official has determined that he poses 
an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States, and those conducting 
the operation would carry out the operation only-if capture were infeasible, the use 
of lethal force would not violate the Fourth Amendment.67 
 
When a U.S. citizen is a leader of a terrorist organization, it is constitutionally 
permissible for the U.S. government to kill that leader in another country, when they pose 
an imminent threat to the American people.68  
In a press conference regarding the memo President Obama was noted as saying, “For the 
record, I do not believe it would be constitutional for the government to target and kill any U.S. 
citizen – with a drone, or with a shotgun – without due process, nor should any president deploy 
armed drones over U.S. soil.”69  Although no lethally weaponized drones have been approved to 
fly over American soil, North Dakota passed a law in April 2015 that allows law enforcement to 
deploy non-lethally weaponized drones against their residents.70 
Part IV: Drones Flying Over the United States 
                                                 
64 Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-
Qa’ida or An Associate Force, Department of Justice White Paper (2011), 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 
471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985). 
65 Id.  
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Karen DeYoung & Sari Horowitz, U.S. to Reveal Justification for Drone Strikes Against American Citizens, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (May 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-to-reveal-
justification-for-drone-strikes-against-american-citizens/2014/05/20/f607bb60-e066-11e3-8dcc-
d6b7fede081a_story.html. 
70 H.R. 1328(5)(1), 64th Leg. (N.D. 2015). 
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 Until North Dakota passed their law in 2015, most state laws focused primarily on 
regulation of UAVs for surveillance purposes and for agricultural or hunting objectives.  In 
February 2015, the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) under the Department of 
Transportation (“DOT”) set forth the federal government’s proposed rules on drone regulation.71  
However, these are only proposed rules, and have no effect on the current states that have passed 
UAV legislation.  
Federal Law 
 The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, which was established to decipher 
how to incorporate UAVs into the national airspace, prompted the formation of the “Operation 
and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems.”72  Under the proposed rule, UAVs 
could be used for multiple purposes, including “crop monitoring and inspecting, research and 
development, educational and academic uses, power-line and pipeline inspection […], antenna 
inspection, aiding certain rescue operations […], bridge inspection, aerial photography, and 
wildlife nesting area evaluations.”73  Operation of drones would need to adhere to strict 
limitations.  Some of the restrictions established by the rule state that UAVs must weigh less 
than fifty-five pounds, be within the line of sight of the operator at all times, not fly over 100 
miles per hour, and be flown only during the day.74  Additionally, the operator of the drone 
would need to meet certain standards.  For example, the operator would have to pass an 
                                                 
71 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to 
be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 21, 43, 45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 107, and 183). 
72 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9544. 
73 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9545. 
74 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9546. 
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aeronautic knowledge test, the Transportation and Security Administration (TSA) would need to 
scrutinize the possible operator, and the operator would need to be at least 17 years old.75  
The requirements established by the FAA are an attempt to address two specific safety 
concerns.76  “The first safety concern is whether the person operating the small unmanned 
aircraft, who would be physically separated from the aircraft during flight, would have the ability 
to see manned aircraft in the air in time to prevent a mid-air collision between the small 
unmanned aircraft and another aircraft.”77  The second concern the rule attempts to correct is the 
possibility that the control link that connects the UAV with the operator’s control system would 
fail.78  These are very valid safety concerns, but the proposed rule only reaches civilian operation 
of small UAVs.  The regulations fail to reach law enforcement personnel or model aircrafts.  A 
“model aircraft” is an “[unmanned aircraft system] (‘UAS’) that is used for hobby or recreational 
purposes.”79  “To date the FAA has used its discretion to not bring enforcement action against 
model-aircraft operations that comply with AC 91-57.  However, the use of discretion to permit 
continuing FAA statutes and regulations is not a viable long-term solutions of incorporating 
UAS operation into the [national air space].”80  Advisory Circular 91-57 simply encourages that 
model aircraft flyers take precautions that do not harm those around them.81  This rule, however, 
is failing to work, as there are reports of drones flying in restricted airport flying space everyday 
on the news.82 
                                                 
75 Id. 
76 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9548-49. 
77 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 80 Fed. Reg. at at 9548. 
78 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 80 Fed. Reg. at at 9549. 
79 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9550. 
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Bruce Bennett, Report Finds Scores of Close Encounters Between Pilots, Drones, CBS (Dec. 11, 2015), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/drones-pilots-close-encounters-report/. 
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On April 22, 2015, House Representative Michael C. Burgess from Texas introduced 
House Resolution 1939 to amend the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 to prevent 
UAVs from operating in national airspace.83  The amendment is known as the “No Armed 
Drones Act of 2015” (NADA).  The main language of the statute says that the “Secretary of 
Transportation may not authorize a person to operate an unmanned aircraft system in the national 
airspace system for the purpose, in whole or in part, of using the unmanned aircraft system as a 
weapon or to deliver a weapon against a person or property.”84  However, there is an exception 
for the Secretary of Transportation to permit armed public UAVs related to operations by US 
Customs and Border Protection, operations undertaken by the Department of Defense, and 
operations conduced by government entities for national defense purposes or in response to 
terrorism.85  Although this bill has a long road before it is passed, if it were to pass it could 
preempt any state law that allows state law enforcement to equip their drones with lethal or non-
lethal weapons.  
State Laws 
Twenty states–Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia and West Virginia–have passed 26 pieces of 
legislation on drones.86  States such as Hawaii, Maryland, and Illinois have not passed legislation 
in order to facilitate use of drones in their airspace, but have passed UAV laws to become more 
knowledgeable.87  For example, Hawaii’s law discusses testing sites for drones, Illinois set up a 
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task force to consider use of drones, and Maryland’s bill simply discusses the benefits of using 
UAVs.88  Four other states have approved resolutions associated with drones, including 
Alaska, Georgia, New Mexico and Rhode Island.89  
When comparing all state drones laws, it seems a majority of the laws addressed the uses 
of UAVs for hunting and agricultural purposes.  For example, Michigan has passed a law that 
prohibits operating a UAV “that uses aerodynamic force to achieve flight or that operates on the 
surface of the water or underwater, to affect animal or fish behavior in order to hinder or prevent 
the lawful taking of an animal or fish.”90  In a similar line of thought, New Hampshire forbids 
conducting drone surveillance on those that are lawfully hunting, fishing, or trapping animals, 
unless prior written consent was given.91  Almost in direct opposition, West Virginia prohibits 
hunting animals with the assistance of a UAV.92  Louisiana is an outlier state that strictly 
regulates procedures of drones for agricultural purposes.93  
Other drone laws that have been passed address the issue of privacy.  Arkansas for 
example has a bill that addresses the use of unmanned aerial vehicles for voyeurism.94  The 
statute reads, “It is unlawful to knowingly use an unmanned vehicle or aircraft…that is 
concealed, flown in a manner to escape detection, or disguised to secretly or surreptitiously 
videotape, film, photograph, record, or view by electronic means a person” without their consent 
and without their knowledge for one’s own gratification.95 California passed its law on UAVs in 
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response to the paparazzi’s use of drones for spying on celebrities, and discusses issues of 
trespass and invasion of privacy.96  
“A person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the person knowingly 
enters onto the land or into the airspace above the land of another person without 
permission or otherwise commits a trespass in order to capture any visual image, 
sound recording or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, 
personal, or familial activity and the invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive 
to a reasonable person.”97  
 
Mississippi’s law concerns privacy as well and criminalizes using UAVs for “peeping toms.”98   
Other states have chosen to strictly regulate law enforcement use of drones.  Florida’s 
“Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act” is very comprehensive, and allows Florida law 
enforcement a wide range of uses for drones.99 Law enforcement agencies are allowed to use 
drones for surveillance and investigation if they first obtain a warrant signed by a judge.100  The 
police are also allowed to use UAVs if “swift action is needed to prevent imminent danger to life 
or serious damage to property, to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or the destruction of 
evidence, or to achieve purposes including, but not limited to, facilitating the search for a 
missing person.”101 Additionally, law enforcement can use UAVs to counter a possible terroristic 
threat if deemed credible by Homeland Security.102   Utah is another state that allows law 
enforcement to “obtain, receive, or use data acquired through” a UAV if the information is 
received pursuant to a warrant or “to locate a lost or missing person in an area in which a person 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy.”103  In addition, Utah’s drone law, entitled, the 
“Government Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” statute sets forth data retention and reporting 
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requirements.104  Furthermore, Virginia allows law enforcement to investigate suspects with a 
UAV pursuant to a warrant, but also allows police to use a drone without a warrant in certain 
exceptions, including Amber Alerts, Senior Alerts, Blue Alerts, and where there is immediate 
danger to any person.105  Nevada is another state that allows drones to be used by law 
enforcement after first obtaining a warrant.106  However, they also include five exceptions to the 
warrant provision, which includes if “a person has committed a crime, is committing a crime, or 
is about to commit a crime” and if there is an imminent threat to an individual or the public.107  
Nevada also sets forth a provision prohibiting the weaponization of UAVs, but this section 
presumably criminalizes these actions for civilians.108  It does not make mention of Nevada law 
enforcement weaponizing drones.  Maine is similar to other law enforcement drones in requiring 
a warrant for an investigation with the assistance of a drone; however, they also set minimum 
standards for the operators of the drone, including training and certification requirements.109  
Oregon’s drone legislation discusses law enforcement’s use of drones, and it is very 
comprehensive.  Like most states, Oregon allows drones to help the police after they have 
obtained a warrant or if there is an emergency situation.110  However, they also have a specific 
section discussing register requirements, and the filing of annual reports.111  Most noteworthy is 
Section 9, which states, “A public body may not operate an unmanned aircraft system that is 
capable of firing a bullet or other projectile, directing a laser, or otherwise being used as a 
weapon.”112  This law is in direct opposition to North Dakota’s law that has just recently been 
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passed.  
North Dakota drone law enacted on April 15, 2015, has garnered much media 
attention.113  Section 5 of North Dakota law HB 1238 states, a “law enforcement agency may not 
authorize the use of, including granting a permit to use, an unmanned aerial vehicle armed with 
lethal weapons.”114   However, although this law specifically prohibits lethal weapons, there is 
no limit on non-lethal weapons, which include, tasers, rubber bullets, bean, bags, and tear gas.115  
Originally, the objective of introducing UAV legislation in North Dakota was to require police to 
obtain a warrant before investigating with the use of a drone.  It was also supposed to prohibit 
the weaponization of drones.116  However, after intense lobbying from law enforcement groups, 
legislation was passed with a loophole that allowed the installation of non-lethal weapons on 
drones.117  The law specifically states that a law enforcement agency cannot use a UAV armed 
with lethal weapons, but makes no mention of non-lethal weapons.118   
North Dakota representative Rick Becker, sponsor of the original bill, vows to try to 
reverse this portion of the law when the House reconvenes in two years.119  In order to pass the 
section of the bill that requires police to acquire a search warrant when using a drone, Becker 
was forced to make concessions on the issue of weaponizing drones.120   
This North Dakota law is in direct opposition to the American Civil Liberties Union, 
which has expressed its view that UAVs should not be equipped with lethal or non-lethal 
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weapons.121  Tasers, for example, deliver a 50,000-volt shock, and are designed to override the 
subject’s central nervous system.122  Amnesty International reported that since 2001 there have 
been 670 deaths from tasers.123  In 2015, police tasers had killed at least 39 people in the U.S. by 
August.  “Rubber bullets, beanbags and tear gas canisters have also caused extensive injuries and 
even death.”124  
Part V: International Humanitarian Law Compared to the Reasonableness Standard of 
Domestic Policing  
At the core of international humanitarian law (IHL) are four fundamental principles: 
humanity, distinction, necessity, and proportionality.125  Humanity is the understanding that 
people have the capability to show compassion and respect to all people, even their enemies.126  
Distinction means that parties to an armed conflict should only target militarized areas and avoid 
heavily populated civilian areas.127  Necessity is the third element and while international law 
recognizes that destruction and casualties are a byproduct of war, it also understands that 
opposing parties do not have free range to do whatever they want.  Necessity means that a 
party’s objective cannot be achieved by any other means.128  The final principle examines 
proportionality.  “IHL proportionality is rooted in humanitarianism.  An attack is proportionate 
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when the expected civilian harm is not excessive in relation to the expected value of the 
attack.”129 
The advantages to using drones in a military setting are very clear.  First, military drones 
decrease casualties.130  When attacking an opposing military target, soldiers can sit far away in a 
control room without having to risk their lives on the battlefield.131  Second, drones cost less 
money to operate, can fly for longer periods of time, and do not have the limitations that restrict 
humans.132  UAVs “are cheaper to make and carry an array of sensors and cameras that can 
watch both day and night.  Without a pilot, drones can fly at altitudes up to 33,000 feet without 
needing pressurization and temperature control.”133  Furthermore, unlike a pilot, drones do not 
get drowsy or drained.134  Pilots in the air cannot simply switch operators midflight, while drone 
operators can continuously rotate in a control room.  Some drones can be kept in the air for over 
40 hours of flight.135  Lastly, drones “greatly reduc[e] the time between the identification of a 
potential target that could be a great distance away and the deployment of deadly force against 
that target.”136 
Although there are many advantages to using drones in a war setting, there is a distinct 
drawback in using an armed drone in armed conflict.  Detaching an individual from the battle 
creates a conflict with the first principle of IHL, humanity.  “There is, symbolically, an 
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extraordinarily dehumanizing aspect to drone warfare in that it deprives, its targets, from ever 
even being able to engage in a humanitarian gesture that would manifest their good will and 
constitute as moral agents of war.”137   
Although drones have only been used in armed conflicts abroad, there have been 
discussions about using lethally armed drones strikes on American soil to stop domestic 
terrorists.  Discussions on this controversial topic arose after President Barak Obama ordered the 
targeted drone killing of al-Alwaki, the al-Qaeda leader and American citizen.  It was ultimately 
ruled that the killing was constitutional, but it also queried whether a targeted killing of an 
American citizen could be undertaken on American soil.138  The Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force (AUMF), coupled with the laws of armed conflict, creates a sufficient basis for 
United States military to use an armed drone to target American citizen terrorists on American 
soil.139 There are certain precautions and threshold requirement that the U.S military must meet 
before they follow through with a targeted killing.  “First, the U.S. government has determined 
after a thorough and careful review, that the individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack 
against the United States; second, capture is not feasible; and third the operation would be 
conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles.”140 
Although it has been established that the United States military can use armed drones 
against American citizens that are terrorists, the question arises as to whether armed drones can 
be used on American citizens who are not terrorists, but who are criminals that commit heinous 
acts.  The Posse Comitatus Act “was enacted after the Civil War to keep local civilian law 
                                                 
137 Frederic Megret, The Legal and Ethical Limits of Technological Warfare: The Humanitarian Problem with 
Drones, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1283 (2013). 
138 Marshall Thompson, The Legality of Armed Drone Strikes against U.S. Citizens within the United States, 2013 
B.Y.U.L. REV. 153 (2013).   
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 170. 
 23 
enforcement from using military personnel and equipment.  It stands for the principle that the 
military should never be used to enforce civil laws in the United States.”141  This would 
presumably prevent the local law enforcement from using armed drones on their own because 
drones first started as military equipment.  However, 10 U.S.C. §372, titled the Use of Military 
Equipment and Facilities, states, “The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other 
applicable law, make available any equipment (including associated supplies or spare parts), base 
facility, or research facility of the Department of Defense to any Federal, State, or local civilian 
law enforcement official for law enforcement purposes.”142  This act would allow for military 
equipment, such as drones, to be utilized by law enforcement officials for policing purposes.143  
Part VI: Analysis  
The core humanitarian principles, specifically proportionality, used in international law 
can be compared to the use of force and reasonableness requirements found in the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution, and the holding of Graham v. Connor.  While the 
proportionality principle looks at civilian harm compared to the expected value of the attack, the 
Fourth Amendment’s balancing test requires evaluating the individual’s interest in comparison to 
the government’s stake.144  When conducting a Fourth Amendment analysis of excessive force it 
is necessary to look at “(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an 
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and (3) whether he is actively resisting 
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”145  Put simply, did the officer take reasonable 
action?  While armed drones have become an increasing presence in war, international law 
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scholars have debated whether the existence of armed drones has had a positive or negative 
impact on war.146  These findings can be used to help decipher whether deploying armed drones 
by law enforcement officials in the United States will escalate or diminish the problem of police 
brutality in America.  Based on all the information set forth above, allowing local police 
departments to deploy non-lethally armed drones on American soil would only escalate tensions 
between the American people and law enforcement, and should be completely banned. 
Deploying armed drones by law enforcement officials in the United States could bring 
many of the same benefits drones have provided in a war setting, most importantly protection of 
police officers.  Cases of police brutality have been springing up across the country, and while 
some police officers abuse their power and are too quick to shoot, many cases involve police 
officers that are generally fearful for their lives and believe they are in a life-threatening 
situation.147  At Washington State University Spokane, officers are participating in a study with a 
state of the art stimulator known as the Violence Confrontation Lab.148  One reporter from the 
media outlet Today “observed on monitors as one officer walked through a realistic scenario, 
during which a simulated suspect fired on him and the officer returned fire. Within 1.1 seconds, 
the suspect fired twice and the officer fired four times.”149  The reporter was then able to test the 
simulator himself.  In his simulation a suspect appeared and pulled out an object the reporter 
believed to be a gun and started firing.150  The object was not a gun, however, but simply a beer 
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bottle.151  It can be very difficult for officers to determine whether objects are guns or something 
else, but if a suspect does pull out a gun, the police officer could be dead before they have time 
to decide. 
The appeal of non-lethally armed drones is that they can limit police officer’s exposure to 
these life-threatening situations while also deescalating the situation with a non-deadly 
alternative.  While this is definitely an attractive alternate, it also raises some important 
questions: would a decrease in a threatening situation give police officers more reaction time 
causing them to be less likely to shoot? Or would the distance between a police officer and a 
possible suspect make them more likely to shoot from a drone that possesses a non-lethal 
weapon? 
The latter question has been addressed at the international level and has been dubbed the 
“PlayStation mentality/phenomenon.”152  The PlayStation theory states that “it is less likely that 
a person controlling a remote drone will hesitate to use lethal force because physical distance can 
break the psychological barrier that inhibits one person from killing another human being.  
Armed drones can diminish the deterrent effects of war by rendering death akin to virtual 
reality.”153  Regarding law enforcement use of drones, although police are not using lethal force, 
the PlayStation theory can still apply.  In fact, it may even apply more aptly because of the lack 
of lethal force.  If police officers think that they can only temporarily harm a suspect, it may give 
them greater incentive to shoot a taser or use a beanbag cannon to apprehend a suspect.  
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“[D]isconnecting a person from armed conflict, ‘especially via distance, makes killing easier and 
[makes] abuses and atrocities more likely’ to occur.”154  
 Although weaponized drones, lethal or non-lethal, should not be used by law enforcement 
personnel in America that does not mean that drones should be banned completely.  Drones that 
can be used for surveillance purposes should be embraced with proper regulation.155  In fact, one 
of the reasons drones were first introduced in America was for the specific purpose of 
surveillance.  In 2004, the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had its first test flight of an 
unmanned drone, and in October 2005, the CBP used a drone to fly along the US-Mexican 
border.156  Currently drones along the US borders are being used for three purposes: patrolling 
the borders, investigating crimes, and disaster response.157  American states without drone laws 
should follow the direction of states such as Utah, Virginia, Nevada, Maine, Florida, and Oregon 
that have passed laws allowing drones to be used, pursuant to a warrant, when obtaining 
information about ongoing criminal investigations or in dire circumstances such as locating a 
missing person.158  Drones have the potential to aid law enforcement without the need for 
weapons or violence.  In fact, North Dakota was the first state to use a drone in a lawful arrest.159  
Rodney Brossart was arrested after six cows wandered onto his farm and he refused to return 
them.  Police were called to the scene and after a 16-hour armed standoff police used a predator 
drone on loan from the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Patrol to help 
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the situation.160  “The drone was able to locate Brossart and his three armed sons on the property 
and let police know it was safe it make to make an arrest.”161  Drones, when used in a 
surveillance capacity, are very beneficial for law enforcement, but using non-lethally 
weaponized drones is too unpredictable, and could escalate the tensions between police and 
citizens even further.  
Part VII: Conclusion  
Law HB 1238, allowing non-lethal drone use by law enforcement in North Dakota, is still 
so new that there has been little time for people to truly gain a grasp on the issue.  However, the 
law does set precedent for future states to follow, and South Carolina and Tennessee have 
already contemplated the subject by placing the issue on the table for their legislature to debate.  
Deploying armed drones across the United States has many appealing features including the 
protection and safety of police officers, but it also has many drawbacks.  Drones eliminate 
human interaction between police officers and the public they are tasked with protecting.  By 
examining the use of UAVs internationally, it can be determined that introducing non-lethally 
armed drones in America is a terrible idea.  The “PlayStation mentality” provides a menacing 
picture of what could happen if armed drones are introduced into the police force, and with a 
country already overflowing with allegations of police brutality, armed drones will be another 
distraction.  If law enforcement is going to continue using drones, they should be doing so in a 
surveillance capacity.  Whether drone laws continue to embrace North Dakota’s position or 
regress from the stance is a question that can only be answered with time.  Whatever one’s 
opinions on the subject however, drones are here to stay.  President Barak Obama said it best, “I 
think creating a legal structure, processes, with oversight checks on how we use unmanned 
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weapons is going to be a challenge for me and for my successors for some time to come.”162 
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